Incentives and Organization
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (with Bengt Holmstrom), Econometrica, 55(2) March 1987, 303-28.
- Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
- Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
- Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (with John Roberts), Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 1986, 18-32.
- Reprinted in Economics of Evidence, Procedure and Litigation, edited by Chris William Sanchirico, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2007.
- Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, edited by Michael Waldman, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
- Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis (with Sharon Oster), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, August 1987, 453-476.
- Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design, Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), February 1988, 42-60.
- Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Reader, Peter Buckley and Jonathan Michie, eds., Oxford University Press, 1996.
- An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses (with John Roberts), American Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), July 1988, S154-S179.
- Economic Theories of Organization: Past, Present and Future (with John Roberts), Canadian Journal of Economics, 21, August 1988, 444-58.
- Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
- Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
- Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
- Reprinted in The New Institutional Economics, edited by Erik G. Furubotn and Rudolph Richter, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991.
- Reprinted in The Economics of Organization and Bureaucracy, edited by Peter Jackson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.
- Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
- Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2003.
- Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
- Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2008.
- The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (with John Roberts), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1990, 154-9.
- Short Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships (with Drew Fudenberg and Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), June 1990, 1-31.
- Reprinted in The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives, edited by Nicolai Juul Foss, New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Reprinted in Readings in the Economics of the Division of Labor, Vol 2: Modern Analyses, edited by Guang-Zhen Sun, World Scientific, 2005.
- Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (with John Roberts), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 57-89.
- Regulating Trade Among Agents (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1), March 1990, 85-105.
- A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention (with John Geanakoplos), Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 5, 1991, 205‑225.
- Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, VII Sp, 1991, 24‑52.
- Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs and Ownership Changes (with Margaret Meyer and John Roberts), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1(1), 1992, 9-35.
- Pay, Perks and Parachutes: Do They Pay? (with John Roberts), Stanford Business, 1992.
- The Firm as an Incentive System (with Bengt Holmstrom), American Economic Review, 84(4), September 1994, 972-991.
- The Internal Politics of the Firm (with John Roberts), The Politics of Exchange and the Economics of Power, Samuel Bowles, Maurizio Franzini and Ugo Pagano (eds.), New York: Routledge, 1998.
- “
Complementarity in Organizations ,” with Erik Brynjolfsson (2012), in the Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, John Roberts and Bob Gibbons (eds), pp 11-55.
