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Mathematical Economics and Game Theory

  1. An Axiomatic Characterization of Common KnowledgeEconometrica, 49, 1981, 219‑22.
  2. Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and ApplicationsBell Journal of Economics, 12, 1981, 380‑91.
  3. Topologies on Information and Strategies in Normal‑Form Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, New York: North Holland, 1981.
  4. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (with David Kreps, John Roberts and Robert Wilson), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 245‑52.(+ Details)
    • Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
    • Reprinted in Trust, edited by Elias L Khalil, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
  5. Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 1985, 619-32.
  6. Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1255-78.
    • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
    • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
  7. Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games, (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior, February 1991, 82-100.
  8. Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (with Dilip Abreu and David Pearce), Econometrica, 59(6), 1991, 1713‑1733.
    • Reprinted in Equilibrium, Donald Walker (ed), Edward Elgar Publishing, March 2000.
  9. Monotone Comparative Statics (with Chris Shannon), Econometrica, 62, 1994, 157-180. (Errata)
    • Reprinted in Paul Anthony Samuelson, Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists, John Cunningham Wood and Michael McLure (eds.), New York: Routledge, 2004.
  10. Comparing Equilibria (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 84(3), June 1994: 441-459.
  11. Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions?Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), June 1994: 607-615.
  12. The LeChatelier Principle (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 86(1), March 1996: 173-179.
  13. Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior 17, 1996: 113-128.
  14. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (with Ilya Segal), Econometrica 70(2), March 2002: 583-601.
  15. Multipliers and the LeChatelier Principle, Chapter 18 in Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century edited by Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan and Aron Gottesman, Oxford University Press, 2006.
  16. Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games (with Joshua Mollner), Econometrica 86(1), January 2018, 219-261.

Latest News

May 1 2018
Paul Milgrom today was welcomed as the new chair of the economics section of the National Academy of Sciences. The Academy was created by President Abraham Lincoln to advise the United States on scientific matters. At its annual meeting, which ended yesterday, Paul was also a co-recipient of the...
Apr 16 2018
The $20 billion incentive auction was a complicated beast, and its auction design and implementation have rightly been celebrated, but they were just part of the successful spectrum reallocation process. The operations research and analytical pieces were crucial as well, and the key people included...
Apr 2 2018
The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) has released a new article about Paul here, and Stanford's GSB has another article here about Paul and his co-winners of the Carty Prize from the National Academy of Sciences.