Publications

  • All
  • Actuarial Science
  • Auctions, Matching and Market Design
  • Comparative Economic Systems
  • Economic History
  • Economics of Manufacturing
  • Economics of the Internet
  • Game Theory and Mathematical Economics
  • Incentives and Organization
  • Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies
  • Macroeconomics
  • Policy Briefs
  • Securities Markets
  • Welfare Economics

Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs, American Economic Review 2021, 111(5): 1383–1405. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.111.5.1383.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Extended Proper Equilibrium (with Joshua Mollner), forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory.

Extended Proper Equilibrium (with Joshua Mollner), forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation with Ilya Segal, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 128, No. 1, 2020: 1-31.

Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation with Ilya Segal, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 128, No. 1, 2020: 1-31. 

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Auction Market Design: Recent Innovations, Annual Reviews, Vol 11:383-405, August 2019. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025818.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design with Steve Tadelis. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, Ajay K. Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb, editors. NBER: 2018.

How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design  with Steve Tadelis. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, Ajay K. Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb, editors. NBER: 2018.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games (with Joshua Mollner), Econometrica 86(1), January 2018, 219-261.

Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games (with Joshua Mollner), Econometrica 86(1), January 2018, 219-261.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Redesigning Spectrum Licenses (with Anthony Zhang and E. Glen Weyl), Regulation, Fall 2017, 22-26.

Redesigning Spectrum Licenses (with Anthony Zhang and E. Glen Weyl), Regulation, Fall 2017, 22-26.

Economics of the Internet

Designing the US Incentive Auction, with Ilya Segal (pre-publication draft shown here). In Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Designing the US Incentive Auction, with Ilya Segal (pre-publication draft shown here). In Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints. Columbia University Press, 2017.

Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints. Columbia University Press, 2017.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Economics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation with Kevin Leyton-Brown and Ilya Segal, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ,Vol 114, No. 28, July 2017: 7202-7209.

Economics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation  with Kevin Leyton-Brown and Ilya Segal, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ,Vol 114, No. 28, July 2017: 7202-7209.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Adverse Selection and Auction Design in Internet Display Advertising, with Nick Arnosti and Marissa Beck. American Economic Review, October 2016.

Adverse Selection and Auction Design in Internet Display Advertising, with Nick Arnosti and Marissa Beck. American Economic Review, October 2016.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: Further Experimental Analysis , with John Kagel and Yuanchuan Lien, Games and Economic Behavior. vol 85, May 2014: 210-231.

Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: Further Experimental Analysis , with John Kagel and Yuanchuan Lien, Games and Economic Behavior. vol 85, May 2014: 210-231.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima. American Economic Review, vol 103, number 2, April 2013: 585-623. [published version]

Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications  with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che and Fuhito Kojima. American Economic Review, vol 103, number 2, April 2013: 585-623. [published version]

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Incentive Auction: Rules and Discussion, by Paul Milgrom, Lawrence Ausubel, Jonathan Levin and Ilya Segal. Published as Appendix C of the FCC 12-118 (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Incentive Auction, Released October 2, 2012).

Incentive Auction: Rules and Discussion, by Paul Milgrom, Lawrence Ausubel, Jonathan Levin and Ilya Segal. Published as Appendix C of the FCC 12-118 (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Incentive Auction, Released October 2, 2012).

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

“Complementarity in Organizations ,” with Erik Brynjolfsson (2012), in the Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, John Roberts and Bob Gibbons (eds), pp 11-55.

Complementarity in Organizations ,” with Erik Brynjolfsson (2012), in the Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press, John Roberts and Bob Gibbons (eds), pp 11-55.

Incentives and Organization

The Case for Unlicensed Spectrum , coauthored with Jon Levin, October 2011.

The Case for Unlicensed Spectrum , coauthored with Jon Levin, October 2011.

Policy Briefs

“Critical Issues in Market Design” Economic Inquiry, vol 48, number 2, April 2011: 311-320. Doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00357.

Critical Issues in Market Design” Economic Inquiry, vol 48, number 2, April 2011: 311-320. Doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00357.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, Sept 2010, vol 70, Issue 1: 62-70.

Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, Sept 2010, vol 70, Issue 1: 62-70. 

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions , with Bob Day, in the Handbook of Market Design, Zvika Neeman, Al Roth, and Nir Vulkan (eds), Oxford University Press, 2013.

Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions , with Bob Day, in the Handbook of Market Design, Zvika Neeman, Al Roth, and Nir Vulkan (eds), Oxford University Press, 2013.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

“Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis,” with Yuanchuan Lien and John Kagel, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Aug 2010, vol 2, number 3: 160-185. [Data files , Instructions , Online Appendix].

Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis,” with Yuanchuan Lien and John Kagel, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Aug 2010, vol 2, number 3: 160-185. [Data files , Instructions , Online Appendix].

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design , with Jon Levin. American Economic Review, Vol 100, Issue 2, May 2010, pp 603-607.

Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design , with Jon Levin. American Economic Review, Vol 100, Issue 2, May 2010, pp 603-607.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Assignment Messages and Exchanges, AEJ-Micro 1:2, August 2009, 95-113.

Assignment Messages and Exchanges, AEJ-Micro 1:2, August 2009, 95-113.

  • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants, SIEPR May 2009.

Policy Briefs

Making Carbon Markets Work, SIEPR May 2009.

Making Carbon Markets Work, SIEPR May 2009.

Policy Briefs

Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions , with Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin. In Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions , with Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin. In Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain, coauthored with Robert Hall. American Economic Review98(4) (September 2008): 1653-1674.

The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain, coauthored with Robert HallAmerican Economic Review98(4) (September 2008): 1653-1674.

  • Reprinted in Political Economy: Critical Concepts, edited by Norman Schofield, Dino Falaschetti and Andrew Rutten, New York: Routledge, 2011.
Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies Macroeconomics

Substitute Goods, Auctions and Equilibrium (with Bruno Strulovici), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 144, Issue 1, June 2008, pp 212-247.

Substitute Goods, Auctions and Equilibrium (with Bruno Strulovici), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 144, Issue 1, June 2008, pp 212-247.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Core-Selecting Package Auctions (with Bob Day), International Journal of Game Theory, 36, 2008, 393-407.

Core-Selecting Package Auctions (with Bob Day), International Journal of Game Theory, 36, 2008, 393-407.

  • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

The Promise of Prediction Markets , multiple co-authors, May 2008.

The Promise of Prediction Markets , multiple co-authors, May 2008.

Policy Briefs

The Promise of Prediction Markets (22 co-authors), Science, 320, May 2008, 877-878.

The Promise of Prediction Markets (22 co-authors), Science, 320, May 2008, 877-878.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets , Journal of Economics Perspectives, Spring 2008, 22(2): 115-131.

What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets , Journal of Economics Perspectives, Spring 2008, 22(2): 115-131.

Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Package Auctions and Package Exchanges (2004 Fisher-Schultz lecture), Econometrica, 75(4), July 2007, 935-966.

Package Auctions and Package Exchanges (2004 Fisher-Schultz lecture), Econometrica, 75(4), July 2007, 935-966.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Economists Statement on US Broadband Policy , multiple co-authors, March 2006.

Economists Statement on US Broadband Policy , multiple co-authors, March 2006.

Policy Briefs

Ascending Proxy Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.

Ascending Proxy Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.

The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Matching with Contracts (with John Hatfield), American Economic Review 95(4), 2005, 913-935.

Matching with Contracts (with John Hatfield), American Economic Review 95(4), 2005, 913-935.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Multipliers and the LeChatelier Principle, Chapter 18 in Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century edited by Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan and Aron Gottesman, Oxford University Press, 2006.

Multipliers and the LeChatelier Principle, Chapter 18 in Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First Century edited by Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan and Aron Gottesman, Oxford University Press, 2006.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Design (with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Design (with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton), in Combinatorial Auctions (Peter Cramton, Richard Steinberg and Yoav Shoham, eds), MIT Press, 2005.

  • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Presentation and Structure of Substitutes Valuations (with Meir Bing and Daniel Lehmann), EC’04: 238-239.

Presentation and Structure of Substitutes Valuations (with Meir Bing and Daniel Lehmann), EC’04: 238-239.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1(1), August 2002: Article 1. (Republished in BePress Advances in Theoretical Economics).

Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, 1(1), August 2002: Article 1. (Republished in BePress Advances in Theoretical Economics).

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Package Bidding: Vickrey vs Ascending Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Revue Economique, vol. 3, no 3, May 2002, 391-402.

Package Bidding: Vickrey vs Ascending Auctions (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Revue Economique, vol. 3, no 3, May 2002, 391-402.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (with Ilya Segal), Econometrica 70(2), March 2002: 583-601.

Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (with Ilya Segal), Econometrica 70(2), March 2002: 583-601.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements (with Stan Besen, Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan Srinagesh), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2001.

Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements (with Stan Besen, Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan Srinagesh), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2001.

Economics of the Internet

Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to Secondary Markets , multiple co-authors, February 2001.

Policy Briefs

An Economist’s Vision of the B-to-B Marketplace. Palo Alto: Perfect, 2000.

Economics of the Internet

Competitive Effects of Internet Peering Policies (with Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan Srinagesh), in The Internet Upheaval, edited by Ingo Vogelsang and Benjamin Compaine, Cambridge: MIT Press (2000), 175-195.

Competitive Effects of Internet Peering Policies (with Bridger Mitchell and Padmanabhan Srinagesh), in The Internet Upheaval, edited by Ingo Vogelsang and Benjamin Compaine, Cambridge: MIT Press (2000), 175-195.

Economics of the Internet

Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction, Journal of Political Economy, 108:2 (April, 2000), 245-272.

Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending AuctionJournal of Political Economy, 108:2 (April, 2000), 245-272.

  • Reprinted in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Combination Bidding in Spectrum Auctions, in Competition, Regulation and Convergence: Current Trends in Telecommunications Research, Sharon Gillett and Ingo Vogelsang (Eds), Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999, pp 19-26.

Combination Bidding in Spectrum Auctions, in Competition, Regulation and Convergence: Current Trends in Telecommunications Research, Sharon Gillett and Ingo Vogelsang (Eds), Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1999, pp 19-26.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II (with Robert Weber), in The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.

A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II (with Robert Weber), in The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

The Internal Politics of the Firm (with John Roberts), The Politics of Exchange and the Economics of Power, Samuel Bowles, Maurizio Franzini and Ugo Pagano (eds.), New York: Routledge, 1998.

The Internal Politics of the Firm (with John Roberts), The Politics of Exchange and the Economics of Power, Samuel Bowles, Maurizio Franzini and Ugo Pagano (eds.), New York: Routledge, 1998.

Incentives and Organization

Game Theory and the Spectrum Auctions, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 771-778.

Game Theory and the Spectrum AuctionsEuropean Economic Review, 42 (1998), 771-778.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Procuring Universal Telephone Service, in 1997 Industry Economics Conference, Industry Commission (ed.), Conference Proceedings, 10-11 July 1997, AGPS, Canberra.

Procuring Universal Telephone Service, in 1997 Industry Economics Conference, Industry Commission (ed.), Conference Proceedings, 10-11 July 1997, AGPS, Canberra.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Procuring Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory to Work, in Le Prix Nobel: The Nobel Prizes, 1996, Nobel Foundation, 1997, 382-392. (Also available on the Nobel Prize site.)

Procuring Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory to Work, in Le Prix Nobel: The Nobel Prizes, 1996, Nobel Foundation, 1997, 382-392. (Also available on the Nobel Prize site.)  

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Complementarities in the Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis (with Susan Gates and John Roberts), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions, John McMillan and Barry Naughton (eds), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

Complementarities in the Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis (with Susan Gates and John Roberts), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions, John McMillan and Barry Naughton (eds), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

Comparative Economic Systems

The LeChatelier Principle (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 86(1), March 1996: 173-179.

The LeChatelier Principle (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 86(1), March 1996: 173-179.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization: Reply, American Economic Review, 85 (September, 1995) 997‑999.

The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization: ReplyAmerican Economic Review, 85 (September, 1995) 997‑999.

Economics of Manufacturing

Deterring Predation in Telecommunications: Are Line-of-Business Restraints Needed? (with Susan Gates and John Roberts), Managerial and Decision Economics, 16 (July‑August, 1995), 427‑438.

Deterring Predation in Telecommunications: Are Line-of-Business Restraints Needed? (with Susan Gates and John Roberts), Managerial and Decision Economics, 16 (July‑August, 1995), 427‑438.

Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing (with John Roberts), Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(2‑3), March-May, 1995: 179-208.

Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing (with John Roberts), Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(2‑3), March-May, 1995: 179-208.

Economics of Manufacturing

Continuous Adjustment and Fundamental Change in Business Strategy and Organization (with John Roberts), Trends in Business Organization: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness?, Horst Siebert, ed., Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1995.

Continuous Adjustment and Fundamental Change in Business Strategy and Organization (with John Roberts), Trends in Business Organization: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness?, Horst Siebert, ed., Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1995.

Comparative Economic Systems

Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior 17, 1996: 113-128.

Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior 17, 1996: 113-128.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

The Firm as an Incentive System (with Bengt Holmstrom), American Economic Review, 84(4), September 1994, 972-991.

The Firm as an Incentive System (with Bengt Holmstrom), American Economic Review, 84(4), September 1994, 972-991.

Incentives and Organization

Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (with Avner Greif and Barry Weingast), Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), August 1994, 745-776.

Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild (with Avner Greif and Barry Weingast), Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), August 1994, 745-776.

  • Reprinted in Explaining Social Institutions, edited by Jack Knight and Itai Sened, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
  • Reprinted in Trust, edited by Elias Khalil, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002.
  • Reprinted in The Foundations Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
  • Reprinted in Social Norms, Non-legal Sanctions, and the Law, edited by Eric Posner, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
  • Reprinted in Customary Law and Economics, edited by Lisa Bernstein and Francesco Parisi, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014.
Economic History

Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions?, Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), June 1994: 607-615.

Comparing Optima: Do Simplifying Assumptions Affect Conclusions?Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), June 1994: 607-615.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Comparing Equilibria (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 84(3), June 1994: 441-459.

Comparing Equilibria (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 84(3), June 1994: 441-459.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization (with John Roberts), Estudios Economicos, 9(1), 1994: 3-42.

Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization (with John Roberts), Estudios Economicos, 9(1), 1994: 3-42.

Comparative Economic Systems

Monotone Comparative Statics (with Chris Shannon), Econometrica, 62, 1994, 157-180. (Errata)

Monotone Comparative Statics (with Chris Shannon), Econometrica, 62, 1994, 157-180. (Errata)

  • Reprinted in Paul Anthony Samuelson, Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists, John Cunningham Wood and Michael McLure (eds.), New York: Routledge, 2004.
Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Johnson Controls, Inc — Automotive Systems Group: The Georgetown Kentucky Plant (with John Roberts). Case #S-BE-9, Stanford Graduate School of Business, November 1993.

Johnson Controls, Inc — Automotive Systems Group: The Georgetown Kentucky Plant (with John Roberts). Case #S-BE-9, Stanford Graduate School of Business, November 1993.

Economics of Manufacturing

Is Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics and the Contingent Valuation Method. Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. Elsevier-North Holland, 1993, Jerry Hausman (ed), 417-441.

Is Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics and the Contingent Valuation MethodContingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. Elsevier-North Holland, 1993, Jerry Hausman (ed), 417-441.

Welfare Economics

Private Information in an Auction‑Like Securities Market, Auctions, Bidding and Contracting: Uses and Theory, edited by R. Engelbrecht‑Wiggans, M. Shubik and R. Stark, New York: New York University Press, New York, 1983.

Private Information in an Auction‑Like Securities MarketAuctions, Bidding and Contracting: Uses and Theory, edited by R. Engelbrecht‑Wiggans, M. Shubik and R. Stark, New York: New York University Press, New York, 1983.

Securities Markets

Pay, Perks and Parachutes: Do They Pay? (with John Roberts), Stanford Business, 1992.

Pay, Perks and Parachutes: Do They Pay? (with John Roberts), Stanford Business, 1992.

Incentives and Organization

Competitive Bidding with Proprietary Information (with Richard Engelbrecht‑Wiggans and Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11, 1983, 161‑69.

Competitive Bidding with Proprietary Information (with Richard Engelbrecht‑Wiggans and Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 11, 1983, 161‑69.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs and Ownership Changes (with Margaret Meyer and John Roberts), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1(1), 1992, 9-35.

Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs and Ownership Changes (with Margaret Meyer and John Roberts), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1(1), 1992, 9-35.

Incentives and Organization

The Real Output of the Stock Exchange (with Timothy F. Bresnahan and Jonathan Paul), Output Measurement in the Services Sectors, edited by Zvi Griliches, 1992, 195-216.

The Real Output of the Stock Exchange (with Timothy F. Bresnahan and Jonathan Paul), Output Measurement in the Services Sectors, edited by Zvi Griliches, 1992, 195-216.

Securities Markets

Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, VII Sp, 1991, 24‑52.

Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, VII Sp, 1991, 24‑52.

Incentives and Organization

A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention (with John Geanakoplos), Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 5, 1991, 205‑225.

A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention (with John Geanakoplos), Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 5, 1991, 205‑225.

Incentives and Organization

Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing (with Yingyi Qian and John Roberts), American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, May 1991, 85‑89.

Complementarities, Momentum, and the Evolution of Modern Manufacturing (with Yingyi Qian and John Roberts), American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, May 1991, 85‑89.

Economics of Manufacturing

Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games, (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior, February 1991, 82-100.

Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games, (with John Roberts), Games and Economic Behavior, February 1991, 82-100.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (with Dilip Abreu and David Pearce), Econometrica, 59(6), 1991, 1713‑1733.

Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships (with Dilip Abreu and David Pearce), Econometrica, 59(6), 1991, 1713‑1733.

  • Reprinted in Equilibrium, Donald Walker (ed), Edward Elgar Publishing, March 2000.
Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Short Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships (with Drew Fudenberg and Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), June 1990, 1-31.

Short Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships (with Drew Fudenberg and Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), June 1990, 1-31.

  • Reprinted in The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives, edited by Nicolai Juul Foss, New York: Routledge, 2000.
  • Reprinted in Readings in the Economics of the Division of Labor, Vol 2: Modern Analyses, edited by Guang-Zhen Sun, World Scientific, 2005.
Incentives and Organization

The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 80(3), June 1990, 511-28.

The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization (with John Roberts), American Economic Review, 80(3), June 1990, 511-28.

  • Reprinted in Vestnik St. Petersburgskogo UniversitetaEconomics seria (the Journal of the Economics Faculty of St. Petersburg University) 5(2), 1993 (in translation).
  • Reprinted in Economics of the Firm: Lessons in Business Organization edited by Andrei Demin and Valery Katkalo, St. Petersburg, Russia: 1994.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Communications and Information edited by Donald Lamberton, Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar Publishing, 1996.
  • Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions, edited by Robert E. Kuenne, Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
  • Reprinted in Fundamentals of Business Strategy, edited by Mie Augur and David Teece, Sage Publications, 2007.
Economics of Manufacturing

The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (with John Roberts), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1990, 154-9.

The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes (with John Roberts), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1990, 154-9.

Incentives and Organization

Regulating Trade Among Agents (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1), March 1990, 85-105.

Regulating Trade Among Agents (with Bengt Holmstrom), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1), March 1990, 85-105.

Incentives and Organization

Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (with John Roberts), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 57-89.

Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity (with John Roberts), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 57-89.

Incentives and Organization

The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant (with Douglass North and Barry Weingast), Economics and Politics, 2, March 1990, 1-23.

The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant (with Douglass North and Barry Weingast), Economics and Politics, 2, March 1990, 1-23.

  • Reprinted in Trade in the Pre-Modern Period: 1400-1700, edited by Douglas Irwin, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996.
  • Reprinted in Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct, edited by Daniel B. Klein. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997.
  • Reprinted in The Political Economy of Institutions, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004.
  • Reprinted in International Institutions in the New Global Economy, edited by Lisa L Martin, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
  • Reprinted in Anarchy and the Law, edited by Edward Stringham, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2006.
  • Reprinted in Social Norms, Non-Legal Sanctions, and the Law, edited by Eric A Posner, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
Economic History

Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1255-78.

Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1255-78.

  • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
  • Reprinted in Recent Developments in Game Theory, E. Maskin, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.
Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

New Theories of Predatory Pricing (with John Roberts), Industrial Structure in the New Industrial Economics, Giacomo Bonanno and Dario Brandolini (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990: 112-37.

New Theories of Predatory Pricing (with John Roberts), Industrial Structure in the New Industrial Economics, Giacomo Bonanno and Dario Brandolini (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990: 112-37.

Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, Summer 1989, 3-22.

Auctions and Bidding: A PrimerJournal of Economic Perspectives, 3, Summer 1989, 3-22.

  • Reprinted in Readings in Microeconomic Theory, edited by Manfredi La Manna, London: Dryden Press, 1997, 95-113.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

An Essay on Price Discrimination, The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, edited by George Feiwel, New York: MacMillan and New York: New York University Press, 1989, 365-86.

An Essay on Price DiscriminationThe Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, edited by George Feiwel, New York: MacMillan and New York: New York University Press, 1989, 365-86.

  • Reprinted in Deregulating Telecommunications: The Baby Bells’ Case for Competition, R.S. Higgins and P.H. Rubin, eds. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, 151‑162.
Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Economic Theories of Organization: Past, Present and Future (with John Roberts), Canadian Journal of Economics, 21, August 1988, 444-58.

Economic Theories of Organization: Past, Present and Future (with John Roberts), Canadian Journal of Economics, 21, August 1988, 444-58.

  • Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
  • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
  • Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
  • Reprinted in The New Institutional Economics, edited by Erik G. Furubotn and Rudolph Richter, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Organization and Bureaucracy, edited by Peter Jackson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.
  • Reprinted in Transaction Cost Economics, edited by Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1994.
  • Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2003.
  • Reprinted in The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard, London, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
  • Reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Firm, edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Kroszner, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 2008.
Incentives and Organization

Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production (with John Roberts), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 90, 1988, 275-89.

Communication and Inventories as Substitutes in Organizing Production (with John Roberts), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 90, 1988, 275-89.

Economics of Manufacturing

An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses (with John Roberts), American Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), July 1988, S154-S179.

An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses (with John Roberts), American Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), July 1988, S154-S179.

Incentives and Organization

Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design, Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), February 1988, 42-60.

Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization DesignJournal of Political Economy, 96(1), February 1988, 42-60.

  • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Reader, Peter Buckley and Jonathan Michie, eds., Oxford University Press, 1996.
Incentives and Organization

Predatory Pricing, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economic Theory and Doctrine, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988.

Predatory PricingThe New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economic Theory and Doctrine, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988.

Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis (with Sharon Oster), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, August 1987, 453-476.

Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis (with Sharon Oster), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, August 1987, 453-476.

Incentives and Organization

Auction Theory, Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, edited by Truman Bewley, London: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 1-32.

Auction TheoryAdvances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, edited by Truman Bewley, London: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 1-32.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization (with John Roberts), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 77, May 1987, 184-93.

Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior and Industrial Organization (with John Roberts), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 77, May 1987, 184-93.

Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (with Bengt Holmstrom), Econometrica, 55(2) March 1987, 303-28.

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (with Bengt Holmstrom), Econometrica, 55(2) March 1987, 303-28.

  • Reprinted in The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives, edited by J-J Laffont, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Contracts, edited by Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
Incentives and Organization

Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (with John Roberts), Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 1986, 18-32.

Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (with John Roberts), Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 1986, 18-32.

  • Reprinted in Economics of Evidence, Procedure and Litigation, edited by Chris William Sanchirico, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2007.
  • Reprinted in Learning in Labour Markets, edited by Michael Waldman, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press.
Incentives and Organization

Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (with John Roberts), Journal of Political Economy, 94, 1986, 796-821.

Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (with John Roberts), Journal of Political Economy, 94, 1986, 796-821.

Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Measuring the Interest‑Rate Risk, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, XXXVII, 1985: 241-57.

Measuring the Interest‑Rate RiskTransactions of the Society of Actuaries, XXXVII, 1985: 241-57.

Actuarial Science

Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 1985, 619-32.

Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 1985, 619-32.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Reply to the Comments on “Measuring the Interest Rate Risk”, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, XXXVII, 1985: 297-302.

Reply to the Comments on “Measuring the Interest Rate Risk”Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, XXXVII, 1985: 297-302.

Actuarial Science

The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey, Social Goals and Social Organization: A Volume in Honor of Elisha Pazner, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, Chapter 9, 261-89.

The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey, Social Goals and Social Organization: A Volume in Honor of Elisha Pazner, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, Chapter 9, 261-89.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Bid, Ask and Transactions Prices in a Specialist Market with Insider Trading (with Larry Glosten), Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 1985, 71‑100.

Bid, Ask and Transactions Prices in a Specialist Market with Insider Trading (with Larry Glosten), Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 1984, 71‑100.

  • Reprinted in Financial Intermediaries, Mervyn Lewis (ed), London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1984.
  • Reprinted in Microstructure: The Organization of Trading and Short Term Price Behavior, edited by Hans R Stoll, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
Securities Markets

The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction (with Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 1982, 105‑14. Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.

The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction (with Robert Weber), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 1982, 105‑14.

  • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence (with John Roberts), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 280‑312.

Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence (with John Roberts), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 280‑312.

  • Reprinted in Antitrust and Competition, edited by Andrew Kleit, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd, 2005.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Reputation, edited by Jill J. McCluskey, and Jason Winfree, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd, 2017.
  • Reprinted in Antitrust and Competition, edited by Andrew Kleit, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd, 2005.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Marketing, Martin Carter, edited by Mark Casson and Vivek Suneja, Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 1998.
  • Reprinted in Readings in Industrial Organization, edited by Luis M.B. Cabral, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000.
Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 443‑59.

Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis (with John Roberts), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 443‑59.

  • Reprinted in Industrial Organization, edited by Oliver Williamson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Information, edited by Steven A. Lippman and John E. Anderson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.
  • Reprinted in Readings in Industrial Organization, edited by Luis M.B. Cabral, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000.
  • Reprinted in Pricing, edited by Michael Waldman and Justin P Johnson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
Industrial Organization and Pricing Strategies

A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (with Robert Weber), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 1089‑1122.

A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (with Robert Weber), Econometrica, 50, 1982, 1089‑1122.

  • Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
  • Reprinted in The Economics of Information, edited by Steven A. Lippman and John E. Anderson, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.
  • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  • Reprinted in Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions, edited by Robert E. Kuenne, Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (with David Kreps, John Roberts and Robert Wilson), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 245‑52.(+ Details)

Rational Cooperation in the Finitely‑Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (with David Kreps, John Roberts and Robert Wilson), Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 1982, 245‑52.(+ Details)

  • Reprinted in Game Theory in Economics, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990.
  • Reprinted in Trust, edited by Elias L Khalil, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Information, Trade and Common Knowledge (with Nancy Stokey), Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 1982, 17‑27.

Information, Trade and Common Knowledge (with Nancy Stokey), Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 1982, 17‑27.

Securities Markets

Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 1981, 380‑91.

Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and ApplicationsBell Journal of Economics, 12, 1981, 380‑91.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge, Econometrica, 49, 1981, 219‑22.

An Axiomatic Characterization of Common KnowledgeEconometrica, 49, 1981, 219‑22.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica, 49, 1981, 921‑43. Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.

Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive BiddingEconometrica, 49, 1981, 921‑43.

  • Reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, edited by Paul Klemperer, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
Auctions, Matching and Market Design

Topologies on Information and Strategies in Normal‑Form Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, New York: North Holland, 1981.

Topologies on Information and Strategies in Normal‑Form Games with Incomplete Information (with Robert Weber), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, New York: North Holland, 1981.

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information, Econometrica, 47, 1979, 679‑88. Erratum.

Auctions, Matching and Market Design

On Understanding the Effects of GAAP Reserve Assumptions, Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, 27, 1975, 71‑88.

On Understanding the Effects of GAAP Reserve AssumptionsTransactions of the Society of Actuaries, 27, 1975, 71‑88.

Actuarial Science