Paul delivered the 2019 Aumann lecture, honoring Nobel Laureate Robert Aumann in Israel in July 2019. This lecture was expanded and updated for Paul’s 2019 Marshall lectures, delivered over two days at Cambridge University in November, 2019. Those lectures were recorded and are available online at this link. The first lecture explains seven reasons why a Vickrey auction was unsuitable for use in purchasing TV broadcast rights for the US incentive auction and how a new design overcame all seven objections. The second lecture pays special attention to another new theoretical problem that had to be solved for the incentive auction: how to clear a market with heterogeneous stations and licenses connected by a complex set of constraints.
Related Post
2020 Nobel Prize Firsts and Lectures
In this pandemic year, Paul Milgrom and Bob Wilson received their Nobel prize medals and diplomas in an abbreviated ceremony in Paul’s backyard on the morning of December 8. The discussion quickly turned to the sheer number of “firsts” associated with this Nobel prize in economics. It was the first economics prize to be awarded […]
Milgrom and Wilson Awarded Economics Nobel Prize
The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel has been awarded to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson “for improvements to auction theory and invention of new auction formats.” As explained in the prize announcement, the prize is awarded annually by the Royal Swedish Academy for work of “eminent significance in the field of […]
AEA Names Paul Milgrom a “Distinguished Fellow”
PAUL MILGROM, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW 2020 The American Economic Association has named Paul Milgrom a Distinguished Fellow, which is the associations highest honor for lifetime achievement. According to the award citation, Milgrom “is the world’s leading auction designer, having helped design many of the auctions for radio spectrum conducted around the world in the last thirty […]
FUEL for 5g
Auctionomics, working on behalf of the C-Band Alliance, has proposed a novel auction design called FUEL (“flexible use and efficient licensing”) to sell rights to use the C-band for 5g. The design, proposed in June 2019, is a combinatorial design in which bidders can bid for between 0-9 licenses in each of 406 different geographic […]